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THE BATTLE OVER STOCKHOLDERS VOICE:
A CRITIQUE OF AGAR V. JUDY AND THE STANDARD OF
REVIEW PROBLEM IN MANIPULATION OF
STOCKHOLDERS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

INTRODUCTION
Wars have many fronts. The battle lines in the fight between the
director and stockholder control models of the world have evolved
dramatically since the early days of the shareholder activism
movement.1 The past few years have seen a remarkable proliferation
not only in the amount of stockholder engagements, but also in the
sophistication of their attacks on corporations. Specifically, public
communication of grievances about intracorporate issues has become
a prevalent approach through which the more active stockholders
privately police director performance on a real-time basis and seek to
influence corporate policy. Objectives for stockholder public
engagement vary, but typically include (1) executive compensation

*

Yair Even-Tal is a member of the Special Situations Research of
Institutional Shareholders Service Governance, whose practice focuses on
engaging with corporate boards, stockholders, and other stakeholders
regarding mergers and acquisitions, proxy contests and corporate governance
disputes. The author wishes to thank Prof. Amir N. Licht, Joel Friedlander
and Prof. Mohsen Maneshfor their kind comments, suggestions, and
discussions relating to prior drafts of this article and its subject matter.
1
See generally Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks,
The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States, 19 J. Applied
Corp. Fin. 55 (2007) (tracing history of the U.S. stockholder activism); L.
Talner, The Origins of Shareholder Activism, at 2 (Investor Responsibility
Research Center, 1983); see also R. Marens, Investing Corporate
Governance: The Mid-Century Emergence of Shareholder Activism, 8(4) J.
Bus. & Mgmt. 371, 373 (2002).
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reforms; (2) capital structure changes; (3) new business strategy; (4)
business combinations (e.g., merger, sale, spin off, termination of a
transaction); (5) governance initiatives; (6) board representation; and
(7) management changes. 2 This once rarely employed model of
stockholder engagement, using extra-judicial communication
activism to exert pressure on managements to bring leadership and
operational changes and asking
rally around them, signaled a marked change in the dynamic of the
governance landscape that may become a significant concern for
incumbent managements. The response of corporate America was
swift. Consistent with the tendency of practitioners to push the limits
of the acceptable, boards of directors sought to block both the front
engagement, using litigation under the guise of purported libel
against those stockholders who voiced their opposition.
The libel litigation tactic posed two questions previously
unanswered by the Delaware courts, or the judiciary in general. The
first question was jurisdictional, in a sense: put colloquially, should
boards be authorized to engage in defensive action even if the
action is taken in the absence of actual, subjective improper motive
other stockholders, as well as stockholders voting rights? Second, if
so, by what standard of review should the courts evaluate the actions
of directors that might impair stockholders franchise and First
Amendment rights?
In early 2017, the Delaware Court of Chancery faced these two
fundamental questions in the momentous decision of Agar v. Judy,3

2

Decisions regarding these matters are exclusively within corporate
See DEL. CODE ANN.
business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under
permitted to interfere with
has provoked intense debate, but that is for another article.
3
Agar v. Judy, 151 A.3d 456 (Del. Ch. 2017).

-making
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but did not address the need for balancing the competing policies of
-law right to stockholder franchise against the
of the right to communicate with other stockholders of the company.
In a first treatment by the judiciary about when a fight letter can
give rise to a defamation claim, the Judy litigation involved
defamation claims brought by incumbent directors of a small-cap
company for contentious statements made by a group of dissident
stockholders amidst contest for control. 4 Explaining that directors
are public figures for electoral-related communication purposes, the
Court held that as the party challenging the stockhold
the directors bore the evidentiary burden of demonstrating that the
purported statements were false and made with malice. 5
While the Judy ruling is significant in that it appears to give
stockholders, of privately and publicly-owned corporations alike,
broader leeway in exercising their First Amendment rights in regard
to intra-corporate communications,6 the decision did not relieve
much of the risk of gamesmanship and concerns about abuse and
intimidation by boards of directors. That is, in its decision, the
Chancery Court focused only on after-the-fact case-specific review of
the directoronduct by balancing their tort law right to
reputation against the constitutional First Amendment rights of the
dissident stockholder group, without addressing the necessity of a
normative duty that would ensure good faith conduct and safeguard
stockholder
or, alternatively, an enforceable standard of review to hold fiduciaries
accountable if their maneuver results in wrongful interference with
7
This failure to impose a

4
5
6

7

Agar v. Judy, 151 A. 3d 456 (Del. Ch. 2017).
See id. at 459.
I refer interchangeably to forms of discourse between a company's
See id.
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with other stockholders against, or penalize the incumbent directors
for wrongfully suing stockholders for statements that were mere
opinion, creates a pervasive incenti
First Amendment rights and highlights the danger of undermining the
integrity of the stockholder vote given that such impermissible
behavior would not give rise to liability.
In the pages that follow, I argue that these policy concerns
emphasize that a stricter approach to regulation of fiduciary conduct
involving manipulations of First Amendment rights is warranted
given the potential for unfair exploitation of the stockholder
electorate. Specifically, this article calls on the courts to engage in a
substantive evaluation of actions by directors that effectively cut off
of defamation litigation. The heightened form of judicial scrutiny
would focus on whether objective circumstances establish that
management acted for requisite improper purpose to interfere with
of actual, subjective improper motive on the part of the board. This
proposed approach would allow the courts to consider the dynamic
factors in play and achieve a sensible balance between tort law rights
against defamation and ensuring that directors are in fact accountable
to stockholders at the ballot box, and do not inequitably interfere
with their right to communicate with other stockholders of the
company.
Before examining high-salience contexts that reflect the
justification for the proposed stricter approach to fiduciary
regulation, it is helpful to review the public policy values that
warrant imposing the additional safeguards when such potential for
abuse emerges.

THE (IN)ESCAPABLE COLLUSION COURSE:
THE TENSION BETWEEN STOCKHOLDERS ENGAGEMENT AND
OUR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
Efforts of those who thrust themselves into a spotlight to quash
criticism, fair or unfair, are nothing new. One manner to achieve the
desired goal of deterring a targeted section of the public from
exercising their constitutional right of free speech is through
litigation and its associated rents. The oppressive tactic of initiating
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a libel action against those who expressed
has
not only
among the individuals at which the threat of litigation has been
directed, but also among the targeted audience at large. 8 The tactical
approach of bringing defamation litigation with the intent to
intimidate and silence had thus posed risks to the societal interests
and public policy values that our courts have been vigilant to protect.
This type of gamesmanship gives rise to policy concerns to a
greater extent when employed by corporate fiduciaries given their
unique relationship and duties owed to their beneficiaries. It is not
surprising then that unduly libelous actions brought by incumbent
directors to inhibit
criticism of management through
communication with other stockholders of the company have been
attracting a great deal of interest from the media, practitioner and
academy.
Investors, unlike other groups of the general public or
unaffiliated corporate stakeholders such as controllers, officers and
directors of a company commit their capital indefinitely to the firm,
but yet retain limited mechanisms to effectively and timely monitor
managerial conduct9 and its accompanied ever-present risk of

8

See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:
Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1978); see also
Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1633, 1649-50 (2013); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 268 (1985); Daniel J. Solove, The First
Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 142 (1997);
Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808,
832-40 (1969).
9
Often cited corporate accountability devices include: (1) intracorporate regulation in the form of independence and governance rules that
regulate director conduct; (2) intensive surveillance of large institutional
Shareholder Services; (4) reputation, social, personal, and professional
constraints; (5) state corporation law, the concomitant risk of shareholder
litigation, and the threat (even if, nevertheless, is still rare) of real personal
liability.
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disloyal or careless actions. Policing director behavior on a real-time
basis, as well as protecting against misappropriation of stockholder
wealth and other improper fiduciary interference with
rights, are subject to even greater difficulties in privately-held
corporations; which are subject only to minimum disclosure
regulatory state regimes, thus creating a unique asymmetry
information problem. 10
This gap of adequate and oversight
mechanism devices mechanisms to ensure managerial corporate
accountability that gave rise to the emerging role of exercising the
constitutional right of free speech as a potent safeguard against the
omnipresent specter of director misconduct. Indeed, entrusted with
the exclusive authority to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation, 11 equity developed a modern accountability
regime backed by fiduciary principles for addressing the acute power
asymmetries in relations between managers of the firm and its
12

actions have thus been subjected to pervasive duties of loyalty and
care when exercising their broad powers over corporate property and
processes. Yet, while legal actions against corporate fiduciaries

10

Malone v. Brincat
a request for shareholder action, the Delaware General Corporation Law does
not require directors to provide shareholders with information concerning
11

DEL C ODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d
undamental principles of the Delaware
General Corporation Law statute is that the business affairs of a corporation
DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a))); see also Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del.
1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v.
Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811
(Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981);
TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 1989 WL 20290, at *8 n.14 (Del.
not shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the business and affairs of
12

See Amir Licht, Lord Eldon Redux: Information Asymmetry,
Accountability and Fiduciary Loyalty, OXFORD J.L. STUD., 1 (Apr. 06, 2017)
https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqx003.
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serve as partial, imperfect traditional mechanism to redress unfaithful
conduct and deter improper managerial behavior, 13 these ex-post
judicial reviews are often outweighed by excessive litigation costs
and substantial uncertainty, and thus far from providing investors
adequate protection against fiduciary misconduct. Similarly, other
mechanisms for making those at the helm of the corporate enterprise
accountable for failing to serve the stockholders interests, namely
replacing directors via the ballot box, are rare themselves, due to
hurdles such as multi-class capital structures, costs,14 limited
access to the ballot, 15 and staggered boards, 16 stockholders seeking a
change in the management team must cross.17

13

In re Anderson Clayton S'holder Litig., 1988 WL 97480, at *5
(Del. C
actions in the enforcement of the fiduciary duties assumed by corporate
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993)
((quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811 (
corporate democracy and the derivative suit are potent tools to redress the
14

N. Gantchev The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a
Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. Fin. Econ. 610 (2013) (finding evidence
that costs associated with dueling consent solicitations average $10.7
million); Hills Stores Company v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 100 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(dismissing challenge by the winning slate in a proxy contest to the payment
of severance upon the change of control to certain executives of the
company).
15
DEL. CODE ANN..tit. 8, §§ 112, 113 (codifying proxy access rules
for Delaware corporations). These rules authorize corporations to adopt
bylaws that include procedures and conditions to stockholders nominations
in director elections, which may include: (1) minimum stock ownership and
duration of ownership by the nominating stockholder; (2) limitation on the
number of directors that may be nominated; (3) preclusion of nominations by
persons who have acquired a certain percentage of stock ownership, or who
have publicly proposed to acquire such a percentage. See also Financial
CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017) (amending ownership
stakes and holding periods requirements for publicly-held corporations'
stockholders to put a proposal for a vote); San Antonio Fire & Police
Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 983 A.2d 304, (Del. Ch.
2009), afl'd, 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009) (rejecting a challenge to a change of
control covenant in a bond indenture permitting the noteholders of the

8
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Thus, facing such uphill battles, one of the few viable avenues
incentivize them to serve the corporate interest is exercising their
constitutional First Amendment rights. Engaging in communication
with other stockholders of the company regarding intra-corporate
related matters from management misconduct and outperformance
vital function for stockholders to raise their concerns in order to push
for an amicable engagement or change by gaining support for a
collective stockholder action. Therefore, an attempt by directors to
deprive stockholders of the right to voice their critique, under the
guise of non-pretextual justification, raises the question of whether,
and if so to what degree, similar situationally conflicted fiduciary
conducts warrant a hard look by courts.

company to redeem their notes at face value if the company underwent a
fundamental change of control).
16
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (expressly permits a certificate of
incorporation or bylaw provision that provides for a classified or staggered
board).
17
See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 67
not provide the solid foundation for the legitimacy of directorial power that it
Takeover Bids vs.
Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
8633,
2001),
be better at leading the firm, convincing fellow stockholders that this is the
case would likely require significant efforts with no guarantee of success.
Stockholders would be making their choices under conditions of uncertainty:
to vote for the rival team, they must be convinced not only that the
-par, but also that the rival team would likely
perform better. Otherwise, stockholders might well choose to stay with the
see also Transcript of Motion to Expedite Ruling,
Flagship Master Fund, LP v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 2017-0165
(Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 2017) (challenge to
requiring
director nominees to be included in the target's proxy
statement).
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AGAR V. JUDY: THE DIFFICULTIES OF RECONCILING
THE RIGHT TO INTRA-CORPORATE COMMUNICATION WITH
FIDUCIARIES RIGHT AGAINST DEFAMATION
This long ignored knotty issue of whether managerial actions
brought with the goal
particularly
during an active proxy contest with defeat of plaintiff directors
looming, warrant judicial intervention had not been addressed by
the courts, neither in Delaware nor elsewhere, until a recent measured
yet important step has been made to establish rules of the road in the
case of Agar v. Judy.18 In a first treatment by a Delaware court about
when contentious stockholder engagement in the form of a fight
letter can give rise to a defamation claim, the Court of Chancery
fashioned an approach to balance the competing interests of
tutional First Amendment rights of
Although the
resulted in a largely fact-intensive ruling, as is often the case in
defamation cases, it encompasses important ramifications for repeat
players in the Chancery Theater, as well as for many observers of
corporate governance outside circles of Rodney Square.
The conflict in Judy stemmed from a poorly performing
2015 stockholders meeting, at which a group of
unaffiliated stockholders opposed the reelection of the incumbent
directors following many years of corporate functions that had not
been carried out and alleged directorial misconducts occurred.19 In
advance of the annual meeting, at which three of the incumbent
directors eventually lost their seat, the dissident group signed a letter
which they distributed to a large number of the company's
stockholders.20

18
19
20

Judy, 151 A.3d 456.
Id. at 479.
Id.
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The circulated letter included a series of statements that accused
the company directors of acting to benefit themselves by engaging in
self-dealing, wasteful, and unapproved transactions. 21 In addition to
the allegation of corporate resources misuse, the letter informed its
recipients that the incumbents have concealed from the stockholders
the existence of court orders entered against the company in lawsuits
brought by its stockholders and noteholders,22 as well as that it has

21

The series of statements included the following accusations
[T]hey were planning to loot [the Company]

lawsuits, we have received documents that show in particular [incumbents]
have engaged in looting the Company. Since June of 2014, [the incumbent
directors] have siphoned over $7 million in cash and stock to themselves and
(3 Carole Downs is now the leader ... and is in the
process of looting the Company along with
incumbents] siphoned over $7 million in cash and stock to themselves and
)
to drag this out and siphon your money out at their leisure. [the incumbent
board] owe you their fiduciary duty to protect the Company assets but
and
time to act and stop them from taking your money. We must remove them
from their positions before it i
22

incumbent directors are] so afraid of you finding out what they are up to that
one of the first things they did when they took over was to take away your
right to call for a shareholder meeting by eliminating that provision in the
Company Bylaws (They even tried to hide this from us until the Court forced
lasted into December of 2014, the Company was forced kicking and
screaming to settle. This loss shocked them to change their plans and forced
that the Court has a restraining order prohibiting them from distributing any
funds to preferred and common stock holders until the lawsuit in Delaware
them that they had to pay the accrued dividends and liquidation preference
ey disclose to you that they
were forced by the Court to hold a shareholder meeting on June 22, 2015 (the
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breached contractual obligations to preferred stockholders. 23 The
letter concluded by urging the stockholders to replace the incumbent
board.24 The removed directors then brought a claim for defamation.
The dissidents moved to dismiss.
The Court of Chancery granted the dissidents' motion to dismiss
in part, holding that corporate directors may be public figures for
purposes of electoral-related communications. Thus, exercise of the
First Amendment right to free speech on intra-corporate issues by
stockholders would not give rise to liability absent a showing in
addition to all other necessary elements of a defamation claim that
the statements made were false and made with actual malice. 25
The rationale for holding corporate directors as public figures
under the tort and constitutional law standards, the Judy Court
explained, was two-fold. First, nominees who run for and take
corporate office as directors, voluntarily expose themselves to
attention and comment on their actions by stockholders, who monitor
their performance. 26 The second rationale for recognizing fiduciaries

and
23

Id. at 468. ((1)
owed on the notes. They were not going to pay the accrued dividends on
preferred stock. They were not going to pay liquidation preference to
outstanding preferred stock. They were not going to pay anything on the GX
License claims. They reduced stock owned by individuals that had been
that $60 million [in cash the Company received from a transaction] will be
down to less than $5 million and [the incumbent directors are] threatening to
renege on their promise to you to liquidate and make a distribution to
.
24
Id. at 467-68.
25
Id. at 477.
26
Id. at 479 (explaining that the voluntary choice of corporate
candidates to thrust themselves in the forefront and endure publicity when
seeking to be elected to lead corporations was a key justification in viewing
them as a public figure for the electoral-related communications purposes).
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as public figures, the Court observed, is that access to corporate
funds that directors can deploy to communicate with investors by
multiple means, enables them to counter criticism and expose
fallacies.27
In considering whether the director-plaintiffs were deemed
public figures, the Court found that by seeking reelection after
prevailing at a hotly-contested proxy contest in the last elections held
in 2013, the director-plaintiffs voluntarily assumed the risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood and therefore were deemed public
figures.28 Elaborating on its reasoning, the Court noted that the
that the dissident group
continuously opposed them, and that both the dissidents and the other
stockholders had monitored their actions, served as further evidence
that the removed directors exposed themselves to the risk of closer
scrutiny.29 The Court then went further and emphasized the
importance of the
greater access to channels of effective
communication, namely the ability to utilize internal corporate
information to respond to the allegations of misconduct by
instructing the
employees to develop rebuttals to the
contentions as well as
control of the content of
the circulated proxy materials, in supporting the conclusion that the
director-plaintiffs were public figures within the community of the
30

With those overarching considerations in mind, the Court turned
to assess whether the statements made in the fight letter were
defamatory. Starting its examination by considering the statements
of the wrongful wealth transfer, the Court determined that given that
the investors knew that the parties were staunch adversaries engaged
in a lengthy duel over the control of the Company, the investors
would consider those statements as a constitutionally protected

27
28
29
30

Id. at 480.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 479-80.
Id. at 480.
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expression of opinion, rather than statement of fact. 31 In further
support of its holding, the Court explained that proxy fight letters
are pitches for a cause, and tend towards emphatic language in order
to sway shareholders to the dissident's side which therefore made it
32
Looting Allegations as alleging
Hence, the
Court concluded, the looting statements were constitutionally
protected opinion under the First Amendment and therefore not
actionable.

Next, the Court turned to assess whether the concealment
allegations could give rise to liability as libelous. Finding that the
incumbent directors failed to meet their burden of proof and establish
that the statements made in connection with judicial orders which
were entered against them in multiple actions were not
substantially true, the Court concluded that the concealment
allegations were nonactionable as defamatory.33
The Court then turned to the removed
final
challenge the payment allegations that included accusations that the
incumbents planned to cause the Company to breach its contractual
obligations and prolong distributions to its investors by engaging in a
related-party transaction. Failing to proffer any evidence that
supported their assertions, the Court held, that at the pleadings stage,
it was reasonably conceivable that these statements were known by
dissident group to be false or alternatively made with reckless
disregard of the truth. 34 Therefore, the Court granted the motion to
dismiss as to payment allegations.
Judy decision is undoubtedly a game
changer for stockholders in a couple of respects. First, called to the

31

Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 484 (quoting Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, The
Delaware Law of Corporations & Business Organizations § 12.8 (3d ed.
2015)).
33
Id. at 486-87.
34
Id.
32
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task
reputation, the Court acknowledged for the first time the need for
protection of the right to communicate with other investors of the
company. Presented with this novel and seemingly irreconcilable
rights to free speech in intracorporate contexts by requiring that
aggrieved incumbent fiduciaries who bring defamation claims for
such communications, bear the evidentiary burden of demonstrating
that the statements were false and made with malice. Thus, imposing
heightened constitutional pleading requirements for establishing
liability for defamation, the Court in Judy provided all stockholders,
whether of a privately or publicly-owned company, broader
protection against wrongful managerial interference with the exercise
of their free speech and voting rights.
Second, the Judy decision presumably extends beyond proxy
contest fight letters to different stockholders engagements, such as
The Viceing in Judy, however, raises corporate
law policy concerns.
The decision seems to overlook that the
incumbents of the Company in Judy wrongfully sued, using
corporate funds, the proponent stockholders about statements that
were mere opinion. Failing to condemn and impose sanctions on
fiduciaries for engaging in an impermissible action creates a
pervasive incentive for fiduciaries to continue in their attempt to
block stockholders from meaningfully and effectively monitor their
behavior, further isolating themselves from accountability, as well as
exercising their core rights to free speech and voting.
directorisolation, rather than establishing normative duty to safeguard against
interests to reputation on the one hand and free speech on the other,
without determining whether fiduciary interference with these rights
meet equitable standard of conduct of corporate directors, leads to
concerns about opportunism, imposition of unnecessary costs on
stockholders and overall wealth creation. Alternatively, the Court
had not seized the opportunity to determine whether board
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communication should trigger corporate law standard of review.
To illustrate the need of establishing a standard of review under
which director liability will be judged in circumstances of potential
manipulation of the stockholders franchise, consider the following
examples. A publicly-traded company engaged in the production and
sale of rare earth minerals has recently completed an initial public
offering. Despite the capital raising, the company struggles
financially due to underestimation of significant costs necessary to
modernize and expand its facilities, as well as a spike in prices of rare
earth minerals, which are subject to boom-bust pricing cycles.
Shortly after the IPO, certain preferred stockholders who hold
registration rights demanded registration of their shares, which they
eventually sold in a significant profit. During the same timeframe,
the company lagged behind its capital budget. Management also
learned that an anticipated loan guarantee would not come through,
jeopardizing a joint venture opportunity.
stockholders again demanded registration of their shares, which they
sold in a profit. At the time of both the private offerings, the
company board consisted of eight members, seven of whom either
sold stock or were affiliated with the preferred stockholders who sold
stock in offerings. A couple of months later, prices of rare earth
minerals dropped. Significantly lagging behind its capital budget, the
company raised debt through a private note offering as well as capital
through stock sales at a deep discount compared to sale prices at
which the preferred stockholders sold their shares.
In the lack of standard of conduct and standard of review to
check potential abuse of power in situations of directorial actions
such as the filing of the
defamation suit minority stockholders would be discouraged to
monitor managerial actions that may be viewed as interested,
suboptimal to the corporation, as illustrated by the example above.
The absence of a judicial review standard of such unleashed
managerial actions, gives rise to the policy concern of
disproportionate incentives of boards of directors to take interested
actions to wrongfully interfere with the exercise of the constitutional
right to speech without being held accountable. That is, the current
regime where stockholders can be held liable for libel by mere afterthe-fact showing that they exercised their First Amendment rights on
incomplete information and thus acted with reckless disregard, while
fiduciaries are not accountable for acting on the expense of the cestui
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incentives of real-time management monitoring.
This risk of erecting unreasonable barriers to stockholder
other investors of the company is virtually always made with less
than perfect information. Despite federal and Delaware corporate
financial projections relevant to transactional votes, 35 material
conflicts of interest, 36 and the process used to reach decisions, 37 no

35

See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc., Shareholders Litig., 808 A.2d 421,

they have large informational advantages that can only be imperfectly
overcome by the special committee process, which almost invariably
involves directors who are not involved in the day-to-day management of the
subsidiary. The retention of financial advisors by special committees is
designed to offset some of this asymmetry, and it would seem to be in full
keeping with that goal for the minority stockholders to be given a summary
of the core analyses of these advisors in circumstances in which the
stockholders must protect themselves in the voting or tender process. That
this can be done without great burden is demonstrated by the many
.
36

, 41 A.3d 432, 434
record is filled with debatable negotiating and tactical
choices made by El Paso fiduciaries and advisors. Absent a conflict of
interest, these debatable choices could be seen as the sort of reasonable . . .
ones that must be made in a world of uncertainty. After discovery, however,
these choices now must be viewed more skeptically, as the key negotiator on
behalf of the Board and a powerfully influential financial advisor each had
37

See, e.g.,

See, e.g., In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. Shareholders Litig., 924 A.2d
171, 177, 209 (Del. Ch. 2007), judgment entered sub nom. In re Netsmart
Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation
it currently stands,
conclusion that strategic buyers in 2006 would not have been interested in
Netsmart as it existed at that time. . . . [It seems] important for Netsmart to at
least disclose this judicial decision or otherwise provide a fuller, more

2017

THE BATTLE OVER S TOCKHOLDERS VOICE

17

other area of the law
as significant as the corporate governance landscape. The reason for
the grave asymmetry problem is encompassed in the fact that
statutory mechanism of inspecting corporate books and records does
not level the playing field, mainly because stockholders who seek to
obtain access to corporate records are required to establish that an
alleged wrongdoing, which is the very subject of the investigation
sought, occurred and overcome merits defenses without access to the
underlying facts.38 Thus, stockholders often fail to satisfy this
requirement because the reason the very claims for books and records
are based on what a stockholder seeks to investigate.
Another set of situations wher

finding a strategic buyer. As the Proxy now stands, its description of that
issue leads one to the impression that a more reasoned and thorough
decision-making process had been used, and that the process was heavily
influenced by earlier searches for a strategic buyer that provided a reliable
basis for concluding that no strategic buyer
38
The right of stockholders to demand inspection of books and
records is by nature conditional, subjected to statutorily, judicial, and
corporate-imposed, restrictions that limit stockholders access to intracorporate information. See 8 Del. C. § 220; Nw. Indus., Inc. v. B.F.
Goodrich Co.
Even legal vehicles for obtaining information about the corporation, such as
where a stockholder sues to compel inspection if her demand is refused or
not answered by initiating a section 220 action, which contemplates
summary and expedited proceedings that emphasizes prompt processing and
disposition, to investigate purported improper transactions, inquire into
management inadequacies, or for communication-related purposes, often
defeat stockholder urgent, time sensitive need to address a rising corporate
wrongdoing on a real-time basis. Scott v. Boca Bancorp, C.A. No. 22649,
slip op. at 1 (Del. Ch. 1990) (stating that expedited treatment not automatic
unless only stock list sought).
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communication right to an appropriate standard of review arises in
suspicious, yet permissible actions.
Take, for example, a saving and loan publicly-held company
whose board of directors has recently approved a number of
amendments to the bylaws due to media publications that a notorious
investment fund firm has considered to increase its stake in the
Company due to its recent disappointing performance. The first
amendment increased the threshold for nominating candidates to the
board from 10% to 30%. The second requiring 80% supermajority
voting requirement to amend the bylaws and provisions related to the
staggered board from seven to five, which results in one seat
than three
meeting.

rather

Given the apparent bona fide actions of the board, which was not
faced with a proxy contest or an expected proxy contest when it
acted, the lack of a standard of review of fiduciary actions that have
-corporate
communication rights such as pretextual defamation claim
Thus, the increasing importance of real-time monitoring of
corporate actions further emphasizes the need of establishing an
accountability mechanism against wrongful interference with
right to speech, even where there is no clear conflict of interest
between the directors and the stockholders, must bestir deep judicial
suspicion to ensure that the legitimacy of the corporate structure
itself is not undermined. Or stated bluntly, Judy emphasizes the need
of formulating doctrinal principles outside the realm of the First
Amendment sphere, to provide strong-form protection where director
to free speech and voting.
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SEARCHING FOR THE OPTIMAL BALANCE BETWEEN
STOCKHOLDERS COMMUNICATION RIGHTS AND CORPORATE
LAW PUBLIC POLICY
right to elect directors is in the first instance
statutory.
Corporate law statutes, in an effort to achieve
accountability of corporate fiduciaries, however imprecisely, requires
that an annual meeting of stockholders be held for the election of
directors.39
Occasionally, boards act in a manner though not specifically
prohibited by the statute nor inherently nefarious that may have the
effect of interfering with or impeding the effective exercise of
corporate democracy by stockholders, especially when a contest of
control is in the background. Keeping with the traditional vigilance
of ensuring the fairness of the process by which directors are elected,
courts have approached such directorial interventions that
40
irrespective of
41
technical compliance with the corporation law statute.

39
40

E.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b)-(c).
E.g., MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del.

carefully reviewing any board actions designed to interfere with or impede
the effective exercise of corporate democracy by shareholders, especially in
an e
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437
Delaware Law for the purpose of perpetuating [management] in office; and,
to that end, for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of dissident
stockholders in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy contest
State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Peerless
Sys. Corp., 2000 WL 1805376, at *7 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holding that although
compelling justification for the adjournment); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore,
771 A.2d 293, 297 (Del. Ch. 2000) (enjoining, under Blasius, the board's
and declassify the board, to preemptively amend the bylaws to eliminate the
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To deal with the complexity of director actions that improperly
interfere with a vote touching upon matters of corporate control, the
Delaware courts in a classic manifestation of the concept of
separation of powers have placed the burden of persuasion on

ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause, eliminate
require a supermajority shareholder vote to amend the bylaws in the future);
Agranoff v. Miller, 1999 WL 219650, at *11-12, *18 (Del. Ch. 1999);
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988);
Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 914 (Del. Ch. 1980)
made it
impossible to comply with an advance notice bylaws requirement after
learning about insurgent's intention to wage a proxy fight).
41
Schnell,
action does not become permissible simply because
Marino v. Patriot Rail Co.
-1967
decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court . . . rendered untenable the strongform contention that a statutory grant of authority necessarily foreclosed
fidu
see also Adolphe A. Berle, Corporate Powers As
Powers In Trust
corporate action must be twice tested: first, by the technical rules having to
do with the existence and proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable
rules somewhat analogous to those which apply in favor of a cestui que trust
to the trustee's exercise of wide powers granted to him in the instrument
Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 672 (Del. Ch.
-tested' once by
accord Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v.
Vertin
adheres to the twice-testing pri
(TABLE); Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Tech., Inc., 65 A.3d 618, 641 (Del. Ch.
-tested, once for statutory compliance and
ig., 808 A.2d
independent legal significance] alters the fundamental rule that inequitable
actions in technical conformity with statutory law can be restrained by
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boards to justify their actions in order to strictly police inequitable
inhibitions of the stockholder franchise. 42

42

In re T
, 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(explaining that enhanced scrutiny applies to specific, recurring, and readily
identifiable situations involving potential conflicts of interest where the
realities of the decision-making context can subtly undermine the decisions
of even independent and disinterested directors. Inherent in those situations
are subtle structural and situational conflicts that do not rise to a level
sufficient to trigger entire fairness review, but also do notcomfortably permit
expansive judicial deference
take a nuanced and realistic look at the possibility that personal interests
short of pure self-dealing have influenced the board."); see Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176, 180 82 (Del.
1986) (applying Unocal test to the sale of a corporation in light of concern
that the directors rebuffed a premium acquisition offer and agreed to a white
litigation by noteholders); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 954 (Del. 1985) (creating enhanced scrutiny to address the
may be influenced by and act to further their own interests or those of
corporation and its
, 41 A.3d 432,
potential sale of a corporation has enormous
implications for corporate managers and advisors, and a range of human
motivations, including but by no means limited to greed, can inspire
MM Cos., Inc.
v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1129 (Del. 2003) (extending the rubric
of enhanced scrutiny to incorporate the principles that animated Chancellor
Allen's decision in Blasius
enhanced s
Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc.,
929 A.2d 786, 811 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75,
92 n.3 (Del. 1992) (holding that enhanced scrutiny applies whenever a board
omitted); Gilbert v. El Paso Corp., 575 A.2d 1131, 1144 (Del. 1990)
(holding that a court must apply enhanced scrutiny whenever the board acts
t
see also Gregory V. Varallo et al., From
Kahn to Carlton: Recent Developments in Special Committee Practice, 53
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Thus, consistent with the central tradition of Delaware corporate
interested action on part of the fiduciaries to improperly interfere
-corporate communication have
sufficient disenfranchising effect to trigger Mercier v. Inter-Tel43 and
Pell v. Kill44 enhanced judicial scrutiny. 45

BUS. LAW. 397, 423 n.121 (1998) (explaining that the two-step Zapata test
tiny courts use to examine the actions of
Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 851 (2004) (discussing standard and concluding that
Zapata is thus quite similar to Unocal
Network Inc.
which mandate that a court take a more direct and active role in overseeing
the decisions made and actions taken by directors. In these situations, a court
., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del.
to two starkly
divergent categories business judgment rule review reflecting a policy of
maximal deference to disinterested board decision-making and entire fairness
review reflecting a policy of extreme skepticism toward self-dealing
decisions the Delawar
43

Id. See Mercier
In prior decisions, this court has
decided that because board action influencing the election process did not
have the effect of precluding or coercing stockholder choice, that action was
not taken for the primary purpose of disenfranchising stockholders. Because
non-preclusive, non-coercive action did not have the primary purpose of
disenfranchisement, the Blasius standard did not apply and thus no
compelling justification for the board's action had to be shown. That is, the
lack of disenfranchising effect provided that the trigger for the test was not
.
44
Judy, 135 A.3d 764 (Del. Ch. 2016) (enjoining plan to reduce size
of board that would maintain certain defendant directors in the majority and
facing an electoral contest, incumbent directors are not entitled to determine
the outcome for the stockholders. Stockholders elect directors, not the other
way around. Even assuming that the Defendant Directors acts for an
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By nature, directors cannot be expected to remain neutral with
respect to matters of corporate control. 46 This omnipresent, inherent
conflict of interest when a board, even if independent and otherwise
disinterested, justifies subjecting fiduciary interference with the
to a heightened
, however subtle, do not
have the effect of outright impairing the franchise. In particular, such
robust judicial review requires inquiry into the context history,
timing, and content of the boa
Invoking an
handed tactic to
right to speech, especially in the context of a contest for corporate
control, is also justified for the reason that the real parties in
interest the minority equity owners often cannot protect
themselves at the ballot box by simply replacing the board.
Furthermore, although establishing that a statement was defamatory
and made with scienter is a tall order, it is the threat of a retributive

ee also Aquila, Inc. v.
Quanta Servs., Inc.
s
creation of an employee benefit trust to hold newly issued stock, thereby
measurably diluting the holdings of a significant stockholder engaged in a
considered under Unocal).
45
Mercier, 929 A.2d at 810-11 (explaining that enhanced scrutiny
review applies to director action that affects stockholder voting requires the
board to prove that (1) its motivations were proper and not selfish, (2) it did
not preclude stockholders from exercising their right to vote or coerce them
into voting a particular way, and (3) the board's actions were reasonable in
relation to its legitimate objective. If the fit between means and end is not
reasonable, then the board falls short.).
46
Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206 (Del.Ch.1987)
corporation, is likely to prefer to be elected rather than defeated. He therefore
has a personal interest in the outcome of the election even if the interest is
.

24

SOUTH C AROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL L AW AND BUSINESS

VOL. 14.2

-interest to hinder
stockholder intracorporate communication rights by miring the vocal
dissident that supports the utility of judicial-intrusive standard of
review.
has the effect of stymieing
would thus go a long way to provide a
strong medicine against impermissible interference with stockholders
franchise.
Employing the enhanced scrutiny test to the directordefamation suit in Judy, as an example, would have likely resulted in
findings that the electoral process has been tainted by inequitable
behavior of the removed directors. Indeed, the directorcommunication rights with other stockholders of the company was
not a blatant and obvious attempt to interfere with the stockholder
franchise or otherwise undermined the stockholders' right to act
directly, but rather a subtle one. Subtlety, however, does not take
conduct beyond the realm of equity.
The backdrop of the
dysfunctional state of affairs of the company under the incumbent
board's management and the animosity between the factions, support
the inference that the directorand perpetuate them, and was not tailored to adequately justify their
wrongful i
their constitutional speech rights.

CONCLUSION: DIRECTOR INTERFERENCE WITH
STOCKHOLDERS INTRA-CORPORATE COMMUNICATION
RIGHTS MUST REFLECT THE POLICY VALUES EMBODIED IN
THE ENHANCED SCRUTINY STANDARD
The preceding discussion highlights the distortion of incentives
that can arise when an appropriate standard of review is not applied
in situations of wrongful managerial interference with the right of
intra-corporate stockholder communication.
In the corporate
community, employing the level of behavior that will subject a
corporate director to liability is a highly sensitive and important
matter. When courts do not carefully inquire into whether legal
unication rights
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may nonetheless be situationally inequitable, they affect director
behavior in ways that are unintended and undesirable.
Judy illustrates this proposition, leaving open to directors to
purposely impinge on the almost sacred right to elect a new board
an area of fundamental importance to stockholders. To align judicial
decision-making with the traditional public policy values of fiduciary
conduct, courts should reassess this decision, and adopt a strict
doctrinal standard to review actions by corporate fiduciaries that
affect the right to intra-corporate communication, and as a result
message to boards and their advisors that they must be very careful
when taking an action that may have the effect of unconstitutionally
-corporate communication in other
words, applying the enhanced standard of review would leave it open
to boards to exercise their broad authority to manage the affairs of the
corporation as well as protect their right to reputation, so long as they
are prepared to justify, in a situationally specific way, their
behavior ; and (2) better balance the competing interests of
co
investors of the corporation.
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